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Increased financial integration within the European
Community has implications for the conduct of fiscal
policy by member nations. This paper shows that with
greater integration, a fiscal policy shift within a given
country willtend to have a diminished local impactand a
correspondingly greater external impact on othermember
countries. This suggests that some convergence offiscal
policies may be necessary within theregion as integration
proceeds.
FederalReserve Bank ofSanFrancisco
Recent plansby the membercountrieswithintheEuro-
peanCommunity(EC)tocreateasingleintegratedmarket
by 1992 have raisedquestions concerning theappropriate
conduct of fiscal policy in interdependent, open econo-
mies. There is little disagreement that this increased
integration will necessitate greatercoordination of mone-
tarypoliciesiftheEuropeancountriesaretomove closerto
their longer-run goal of a full monetary union, possibly
with a common currency. However, the possibleneed to
establish a community-wide fiscal policy stance either
throughfiscal policy"harmonization" orcoordination has
onlyrecently received muchattention.Areportsponsored
bytheECandissuedinApril1989 suggestedthatalthough
thelevel andcomposition ofgovernment spending aswell
as many revenue measures shouldremainthe preserve of
memberstatesevenin the finalstage of economic union,
closercoordination of nationalbudgetary policiesmaybe
necessary. 1
An important concern underlying these policy rec-
ommendations is the presumption that the EC's moves
to liberalize capital flows will magnify the domestic
and international transmission of economic disturbances,
particularly divergent fiscal policies. In the absence of
controls, some believe fiscal policy shifts and other dis-
turbances couldleadtogreatermacroeconomic instability.
Large divergences in budgetary positions and marked
differences in external balance amongEC members have
reinforced this concern.
Thispaperaddresses thequestion whether liberalization
ofcapitalcontrols intheECwillmakegreaterharmoniza-
tion or coordination of fiscal policiesmoredesirable. We
analyzehowtheeffects ofpolicychangesanddisturbances
are likely to change in response to greater interest rate
linkage associated with increasing financial integration
withinthe Ee. In particular, we investigate the meritsof
theviewthatahigherdegreeofcapitalmobility islikelyto
cause divergentfiscal policies to have greatly magnified
-and potentially destabilizing-real effects on the EC
economies.
Our analytical framework highlights the role of inter-
temporal budgetconstraints andprivatesectorbehavior in
the context of a two-period, two-country framework. In
this framework, privateand public sector spending deci-
sionsarenotindependentevents withaone-time outcome,
17but are multiperiod decisions linked across time through
borrowing and lending. Moreover, our framework con-
siders the effects of government policies in a general
equilibrium setting with rational, forward-looking house-
holds. This allows us to focus on the interactions between
financial liberalization and fiscal policy in the two coun-
tries in a well-defined way that is not possible in a small
open economy setting.
The framework is designed to analyze the effects of
financial liberalization and fiscal policy on real consump-
tion, saving, trade balances, and real interest rates in the
two countries. In concentrating on the real side of the
economy,however,we abstract from some other important
issues. In particular, wedonot attempt to assess theeffects
of financial liberalization on the operation of a monetary
union and the maintenance of fixed nominal exchange
rates. A number of other recent papers have addressed
these issues (for example, Lane and Rojas-Suarez, 1989).
A major conclusion of our analysis is that greater finan-
cial liberalization creates an environment in which fiscal
disturbances originating at home tend to have smaller
consequences for the domestic economy and larger con-
sequences for the foreign economy. In particular, a home
fiscal expansion places less upward pressure on domestic
interest rates and more upward pressure onforeign interest
rates as financial integration grows. Correspondingly, do-
mestic consumption is "crowded out" less, and foreign
consumption declines more. Fromthis perspective, thecall
forgreaterfiscalpolicy harmonizationorcoordination may
be viewed as an effort by individual EC nations to limit the
increased exposure to disturbances emanating from other
European economies that accompanies greater financial
integration.
This paper is organized as follows. Section Ipresents an
overview of the major financial liberalization measures
and the process of financial integration that have taken
place over the past several years among the EC member
countries. It also presents some summary historical statis-
ticscovering thefiscal stances and debt positions ofthe EC
nations. In Section II we formally analyze the economic
effects of increased financial integration. Section III con-
cludes the paper with a number of policy implications.
I. Financial Integration andFiscal Policy intheEC
Removingbarriers to capital movementsis acentral part
of the EC plan for financial integration, as it lays the
foundation for the integration of financial markets and
provision of financial services. 2 As mentioned above,
however, many are concerned that divergent fiscal stances
among the member states of the EC could have adverse
consequences in a deregulated financialenvironment. This
section provides a brief overviewoffinancialintegration in
the EC and presents summary statistics demonstrating the
existing divergences in fiscal positions.
Financial Integration
European countries traditionally have imposed a wide
variety of restrictions and taxes on international financial
transactions, most with the intent of limiting net capital
outflows." In some cases these controls havetaken theform
oflimits ontheextent domestic residents can invest abroad
either through the imposition of quantitative quotas, as in
France after 1981 and the United Kingdom until1979, or
prohibitive taxes, as in Italy. Likewise, dual exchange rate
systems, as in Belgium and Luxembourg, often work to
limit capital outflows when particular international fi-
nancial transactions are restricted to being conducted at a
less advantageous exchange rate thanothertransactions. In
other cases, capital controls have taken the form of re-
strictions on foreigners' borrowing in domestic capital
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markets. This has been practiced by France, Italy, and
Denmark.
The effect of such restrictions has been to discourage
active arbitrage between domestic and international finan-
cial markets and to reduce the linkage between interest
rates at home and abroad. Giavazzi and Giovannini (1986)
show that capital controls limited arbitrage between do-
mestic and offshore market interest rates in France and
Italy between 1979 and 1985. This effect is particularly
pronounced for Italy, but also has been apparent in France
during periods of turbulence in the European Monetary
System. Frankel and MacArthur (1988) use data on cov-
ered interest differentials for domestic securities over the
period from 1982to 1987, and findthat France and most of
the small European countries effectively limited capital
market arbitrage, thereby maintaining domestic interest
rates at lower levels than otherwise would have been the
case." Giavazzi and Pagano (1985) and Barone, et. al.
(1989) present evidence that Italian capital controls ef-
fectively limited capital outflows during the early 1980s.
The chart reproduces evidence presented by Barone,
et. al. (1989)showing that domestic Italian rates (Treasury
Bill rates) have been lower than offshore Lira rates (Euro-
lira deposit rates). Effective restrictions on capital out-
flows, particularly in the early 1980s, presumably limited
arbitrage possibilities and the ability of domestic residents
Economic Review / Spring1990Italian Domestic-Offshore
Interest Differentials* DivergentFiscal Positions
It is clear that the EC member states have pursued
widely variedbudgetary policies over the past decade with
no.recent moves toward convergence. Table 1 presents
some summary fiscal statistics on general government
financial balances and debt for the EC nations. The table
shows wide variation in budgetary positions in 1987: the
general government financial balance of Denmark was in
surplus, while Germany, France, and the United Kingdom
displayed small deficit positions of two percent of Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) or less. The remaining six EC
nationsposted significantlylarger financial deficits. More-
over,although the financial position of these countries has
changed in the past decade, the magnitude of the diver-
gences in government financial positions has remained
approximately constant: similar cross-country variation
in government financial balances was in evidence a dec-
ade ago.
Theoutstanding public debt positions of the EC nations
reflect the diversity of their budgetary positions. Net
public debt positions in 1987, for example, ranged from a
lowof22.6percent ofGDPforGermany to ahigh of121.8
percent for Belgium. Moreover, the figures in Table 1also
show that the diversity in debt positions among the EC
nations at present is roughly the same as that prevailingat
the beginning of the decade. No moves toward fiscal
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* Italian Treasury bill rates minus interest rates on lira
deposits in the Euro-market. Interest rate levels are
monthly averages of daily rates.
to take advantage of higher Euromarket rates. Barone,
et. al. suggest that the narrowing of the domestic-offshore
interest differential in recent years and its reduced vol-
atilityprovide evidence of theprogress alreadyachievedin
liberalizing international capital movements in Italy. 5
In fact, the gradual relaxation of restrictions on inter-
national capital flows in most EC nations has been a
general phenomenon since theearly 1960s.Althoughthere
were several notable setbacks in the 1970s, as a number
of countries reimposed controls in the face of balance
of payments problems, momentum was regained in the
early 1980s. Moreover, in 1986the European Community
agreed in principle to remove capital controls directly
related to trade and investment, and in 1988to removeall
remaining controls.
At present, the United Kingdom, Germany, theNether-
lands, andDenmarkhavefullyeliminated capitalcontrols.
Belgium, Luxembourg, France, and Italy still havea few
remaining barriers, but are scheduled forcompleteliberal-
ization by July 1990.6 (The dual rate system of Belgium-
Luxembourg is scheduled to be eliminated by the end of
1992.)The fewrestrictions that doremainforthesenations
include French and Italian restrictions on accounts held
abroad by residents and the Italian restrictions associated
withtheforeign exchange monopolyofthecentralbank. In
Italy, residents still have an obligation to surrender all
foreign exchange earnings and are not allowed to hold
foreign deposits. Banks, likewise, are restricted in their
holdings of foreign exchange and net open positions.












Federal· Reserve Bank of San Francisco 19The calls for greater convergence and coordination of
fiscal policy are in part based on the strong economic
linkages that already exist within the EC, particularly
among the nations participating in the European Monetary
System, and on the expectation that deregulation of capital
controls will strengthen these ties.
Simulations of a number of large econometric models
illustrate these strong linkages, not least on the fiscal side.
Representative results from these exercises, presented in
Table 2, show the effects of independent fiscal expansions
in each of the largest EC countries. The experiment shown
is the effectof a sustained rise in real governmentexpendi-
ture equal to one percent of GNP on the level of domestic
and foreign real GNP. One year following a one percent
fiscal expansion in Germany,Frenchreal GNP isestimated
to rise by .44 percent, Italian GNP by .45 percent, and
U.K. GNP by .07 percent. The multipliers for France and
Italy are smaller by a fraction corresponding to the size of
their economies, but nonetheless are significant. Clearly,
the degree of linkage among EC nations-even with the
existing degree of international capital mobility-is suffi-
ciently large as to transmit fiscal shocks from one EC
nation to another.
Nonetheless, it is not entirely clear from a theoretical
perspective that this will present a particular problem for
these economies after the complete removal of capital
controls within the EC. In particular, it is not obvious that
the disruptive effects of fiscal divergences ("shocks")
need increase as the degree of capital mobility increases.
We address this issue below within the context of a simple
theoretical framework.
In the following analysis, werefer to EC nations that are
in the process of removing the existing controls and
restrictions on capital outflows as "Italy." Those that
already haveremoved restrictions on international capital
movements, but are likely to be affected by the liberaliza-
tion process in other EC nations, are referred to as "Ger-
many." The starting point for our analysis is that both the
"Italian" private and government sectors are netborrowers
abroad." In addition, it is assumed that controls on capital
outflows effectively limit the extent to which "Italian"
private residents purchase foreign assets, while encourag-
ing them to borrow more abroad. This implies that private
net foreign lending (borrowing) is less (more) than in the
absence of controls. Since one of the motivations for the
introduction of capital outflow controls presumably is the
desire to finance government debt domestically at rela-
tivelyfavorablerates, 9 thelevelofforeign government debt
financing may be interpreted as being less than would
otherwise be the case in the absence of controls.
II. Analytical Framework
This section develops a simple model to explore the Wecapture these effects within a real, two-period, two-
effects of increased financial integration on the countries country framework. The two-period assumption allows us
within an economic union. In particular, we analyze the to capture the flavorof intertemporal decision making and
way greater financial integration influences the impact of relationships within the simplest possible setting. The
changes in fiscal policy on real macroeconomic variables general results we obtain are invariant to a multiperiod
such as real interest rates, consumption levels, and the setting. The two-country framework allows us to focus on
trade balance. thedirect and indirect interactions between twoeconomies
The model highlights the role of intertemporal budget in awell-defined waythat is notpossible with a small open
constraints and private sector behavior. This intertemporal economy model. In this analysis we focus on the "real"
perspective is crucial in analyzing the general equilibrium aspects of integration and abstract from monetary issues.
effects of particular policies in a framework with rational,
forward-looking households. 10
20 Economic Review / Spring 1990Cf = Yf - Tf - B* - Fv - Fs (3)
Ci = Yi - Ti + (1+r;)B* + (1+rf) (FP+Fg) (4)
where foreign variables are denoted by asterisks and
defined analogously to the home variables. For example,
B* denotes lending by foreign (German) households to the
foreigncountry (German) government, and r; denotes the
associated interest rate. Fv represents net borrowing by
Italian households from German households, as defined
above (negative levels of p» denote net foreign lending by
Italianhouseholds); Fg denotes borrowing by the Italian
government from German households; and the associated
The Model
Consider a world of two countries, each of which has
ahousehold sectorand government. Thehomecountrywill
bereferred to as Italy,and the foreign country asGermany.
Ineach period t (1= 1,2), the home country produces a
given quantity of output Ytof a single good; the foreign
country produces Yt of the same good. Out of these
quantities, residents in each country pay T,and Tt* lump-
sum units of taxes to their respective governments. They
also invest in local government bonds and borrow (orlend)
abroad. What is left over is consumed.
Specifically, the home (Italian) households' first and
second period budget constraints are:
where Ct denotes consumption in period t, B denotes
lending by home country households to the home country
(Italian) government, and Fv denotes borrowing from
foreign(German) households in period 1.It isassumedthat
theassociatedinterest rates on these activities arerband rr-
respectively. Equation (1)defines home country consump-
tion in the first period as output plus foreign borrowing net
oftaxes and domestic lending. Consumption in the second
period is given by output, net of taxes, plus the return
earned on first-period lending, net of foreign debt repay-
ment. Thetwo-period horizon of the model implies that all
borrowing undertaken in period 1is repaid in period2, and
nonewdebts are incurred. For simplicity wehaveassumed
that there is no real investment and that output is ex-
ogenous.
Households in the foreign country, Germany, are as-
sumed to lend both to their own government and to the
Italian government, while also lending to Italian house-
holds. The period budget constraints for the German
households are:
interest rate from the perspective of German households,
rt, is assumed identical for these two cross-border finan-
cialactivities. Note that in this two-country setup foreign
borrowing by the Italian private sector from German
households, rv, represents lending by the German private
sector, - Fp.
With perfect capital markets and no tax differentials,
international capital arbitrage implies that the relevant
interest rates faced by residents in the home and foreign
countries will be equalized; that is, rb = rf = rt = r;.
International capital controls, however, drive a wedge
between these rates from the point of view of Italian
households. In particular, we assume that
(5) (1+rf)= (1+rf)/(1 +u), O<u<l,
where u reflects the reduction in the return to Italian
residents on lending abroad that arises from controls on
capital outflows. These controls reduce the interest rate
received by Italians on foreign lending below that paid by
theGerman borrowers; thatis, rf< rt. Thereduction inthe
return to home households may be interpreted as arising
from a combination of deadweight losses and taxes associ-
ated with the controls. II Such controls correspondingly
imply that the interest rate paid by Italian residents on
foreign borrowing will be below that received by German
lenders.
Weassume thatcontrols affectonly internationalcapital
flows, and that arbitrage continues to operate in domestic
markets. Thus, interest rates within each country are
equalized; rb = rfand r; = rt, implying rb = rf< rt =
r;. Tosimplify the notation in our subsequent analysis, we
define r = rb = rf and r* = rt = r;.
The intertemporal consolidated present-value budget
constraint for the household sector in each country may be
obtained by dividing (2) and (4) by 1+rand 1+ r*,
respectively, and adding the resultant equations to (1) and
(3), respectively:
CI + RC2 = YI + RY2 - (TI + RT2) (6)
Cf + R*Ci = yt + R*Yi - (Tf + R*Ti) (7)
where R = 1/(1+r) and R* = 1/(1+r*) are the period 1
present valuefactors. Theintertemporal budget constraints
in each country limit consumption by the difference be-
tween the discounted present value of output and taxes.
Note that this specification implies that as long as the
discounted sums of taxes, TI+RT2 and Tf+R*Ti, re-
main unchanged, the timing of taxes does not influence
private sector behavior.12
While government spending and taxes are given from
(1)
(2)
CI = YI - TI - B + Fp
C2 = Y2 - T2 + (1+rb)B - (l+rf)FP
Federal Reserve BankofSanFrancisco 21the point of view of households, theyare linked together
through the requirementthat the government be solvent.
The government budget constraint requires that in each
period .gove~ment outlays be financed by taxes or by
domesticforeigndebt issue and that in the last period all
debt berepaidwithoutissuingnewliabilities. Thusforthe
domesticcountry government,
GI = TI + B + Fg (8)
G2 = T2 - (1+r)B - (1 +r*) Fe (9)
:vhere.Fg denotes (Italian)government foreign borrowing
III penod 1. (Negative levelsof denote foreignpublic
lending.) TheItalian government borrowsdomestically at
the domestic interest rate r. When borrowing abroad,
however, .it is assumed that it does not face the capital
controls Imposed on the private sector, and the relevant
interest ratefordomestic government borrowingabroadis
the foreign interest rate r*. Moreover, to simplify the
analysis, it is assumed that the government is unable to
extract by taxes any of the interest differential r* - r
associated with the domestic household sector's foreign
borrowing and lending.
The domestic government's present-value budget con-
straint maybe obtained analogously to thatforthe private
s~ctor. Dividing (9) by 1+r and adding the result to (8)
gives:
GI + RG2 = TI + RT2 - uFg (10)
where use has been made of the result that (5) implies
R/R* - 1 = u. Although government spending, taxing,
~nd financing decisionsare all assumedexogenous, equa-
tion (10) makesclear that theyare not independentof one
another since the government's lifetimebudget constraint
must be satisfied. In the presence of controls on private
sectorcapitaloutflows (u > 0), (10) impliesthatthepresent
value o.f government revenue (discounted at the private
homediscountrate r) isreducedthegreateristheextentof
public foreign borrowingFg. Intuitively, the existenceof
controls oncapital outflows bottlesup domesticfundsand
pushes down the home interest rate to a level below the
foreign interest rate. Government borrowing (lending)
abroad then implies a loss (gain) in revenue relative to
borrowing (lending) domestically.
Inthecaseoftheforeigngovernment, it isassumedthat
it b?rrows only from its local residents. Thus the single-
penod andpresent-value budgetconstraintsabroadcan be
written as:
Gt = Tt + B*
Gt = Tt - (1+r*)B





Fully-informed, rational agents "see through" the gov-
ernment budget constraints, and recognize that the levels
of government spendinggenerate(implied)taxliabilities.
Hencetheyincorporatetheimplicationsofthegovernment
budgetconstraints into their own budget constraints. The
resulting consolidated budget constraint for the home
countryisobtainedby substituting(10) into(6)andnoting
that (5) implies R = R*(l+u):
CI + RC2 = YI + RY2 - (GI +RG2 ) - uFg "'" W (14)
Therighthandsideof (14) maybeinterpretedasameasure
ofhouseholdwealthW, definedas thedifferencebetween
the present value of output and taxes, discounted by the
domestic interest rate, plus a term associated with the
(exogenous) foreignfinancing actionsofthehomegovern-
ment.13Thecorrespondingconstraintfortheforeign coun-
try is obtained analogously by substituting (13) into (7):
q + R*Ci = Yf + R*Y! (Gf+R*Gi) ee W*(15)
Severalobservations may be drawn from (14) and (15)
concerning the effects of government policies on house-
hold wealth. First, observe from (14) that the home gov-
ernment's foreign financing actions, Fs, affect home
householdwealthbecausecapital outflow controlsreduce
theforeigninterestratefacedbyhouseholds (r) belowthat
facedby thegovernment (r*). Thisimpliesthatborrowing
abroad by the home government reduces its discounted
revenue, increasesitsneedfordomestic financing ofgiven
public spending levels, and thereby lowers privatesector
wealth.Foreignlending by the Italian government hasthe
rev~rse eff~ct. This may be interpreted as an example in
which capital controls break down the Ricardian equiv-
alence between lump-sum taxes and foreign financing.!"
Weshallseebelow thatthroughthis wealtheffectgovern-
mentfinancing will influence householdbehaviorand the
real economicequilibriumof the home and foreign coun-
tries.l>
Second, observe that given the pattern of government
spending,Ricardianequivalence stillholdsbetweenlump-
sum taxes and domestically-issued public debt, neitherof
which enters into (14). Thus households do not perceive
domestic public debt as affecting private wealth.!" This
implies that there is a distinction between government
expenditures financed by taxes or domestically-issued
~ublic debt, on the one hand, and government expend-
itures financed by reduced (increased) foreign public
lending(borrowing), on the other. Thusa switchfromdo-
mestically-financed government expenditures to foreign-
financed government expenditureswillhaverealeffectsas
long as capital controlsexist.'? Observe from (15) that in
theforeigncountrywherethereare no suchcontrols,only
the present valueof government expenditures matters.
EconomicReview / Spring1990Optimal Household Behavior and Equilibrium
The households in each country are assumed to maxi-
mize lifetime utility subject to the intertemporal budget
constraints above, where lifetime utility is defined as:j8
The wealth coefficients represent the marginal (and aver-
age) propensities to consume out of wealth in each period.
Observe that these propensities are all less than 1.
In equilibrium, the world supply of the single good is
equal to the demand in each period. Thus, in period I,
w W*
Yj+yt= I+D + I+D* +Gj+G[ (22)
where Wand W* are given by the righthand sides of (14)
and (15), respectively. An analogous condition defines
equilibriumin period 2. It can be shown, however, thatthis
condition is redundant.
By substituting the definitions of Wand W* into (22),
we obtain an equation that relates the equilibrium foreign
interest rate factor,R*, to the government spending levels,
Gt and G;'; home country foreign financing, Fs; output
levels, Y t and Y;,; the degree of home country capital
controls, u; and the subjective time preference factors, D
and D*:
a. Domestically-financed government expenditures
Themultipliereffects oftemporary fiscalpolicy changes
on the equilibriumforeign interestrate I+r* = 11R*may
Effects of Reduced Capital Controls
We are now able to investigate how financial liberali-
zation may change the impact of fiscal policy on key
macroeconomic variables, particularly interest rates, con-
sumption levels, and the trade balance. We will consider
three ways in which fiscal policy might change: (a) a
domestically-financed increase in government expendi-
tures;thatis, dGl > 0, dFg = 0; (b)achange fromdomestic
to international financing of a given level of government
expenditure; that is, dGl = 0, dFg = - (dTj + dB) > 0;
and (c) an internationally-financed increase in government
expenditures; that is, dGj = dFg> 0, d'I', + dB = 0. The
results of these exercises are summarized in Table 3.
Inspection of (23) and (24) indicates that the effects of
exogenousdomestic supply shocks(dYj > 0)aresymmetri-
cal to case (a). The analysis of the effects of foreign and
future fiscal policy changes is similar, but is notpresented.
(Yj-Gj)D(I+D*) + (Yf-GnD*(1+D) + uFg(l+D*)
R* = (23)
(Y2-G2)(1+D*)(1+u) + (YI-Gf)(l+D)
Thehome interestrate factor follows immediately from (5)
which impliesR = R*(1+u).
Wewill discuss the determinants of interest rates below.
Beforedoing so, wenote that the home country's trade bal-
ance surplus in period 1,TBl'is given by thedifference be-
tween its output and absorption, TBl = Yl - G1 Cj .20
Substituting with (14),(5), (20), and (23) yieldsthe follow-
ing expression:
(y* -G*)[(Y -G )D+uFg] - (I +u)(Y*-G*)D*(Y -G ) TB = 2 2 I I j j 2 2 (24)
j (Y2-G2)(l +D*)(l+u)+(Yf-Gf)(l +D)
Observe that in the special case of balanced growth
and fiscal spending across countries and time (that is,
Y -G - Y -G - Y*-G* - Y*-G* - Y-G) 11-22-1 j-2 2-
and no capital controls (u = 0), equation (24) reduces to
TBj = (D- D*)(Y- G)/(2 +D+D*) which is negative if
D< D*;that is, ifd> d*.21Thus the home country runs a
trade deficit in the firstperiod ifit has a higher rate of time










Cr = 1+D* ;Cf = [R* ] [
where D = 1/(1+d), D* = 1/(1+d*) denote subjective
discount factors, and d, d* denote the corresponding
subjective rates of time preference.19 The solution to this
problem implies that the households in the two countries
will choose intertemporal patterns of consumption which
satisfy:
C/C2 = (R*ID) (1+u) (18)
Cr/Cf = R*ID* (19)
Thus the lower is the interest rate relative to the rate of
social time preference (that is, the higher is R*ID or
R*ID*), the less is the incentive to lend, and thegreater is
the level of first period consumption relative to that in the
second period. Note that capital controls, by restricting
outflows and foreign lending by Italian households, also
workto increase current relative consumption forthehome
country.
Optimization also requires that the economy-wideinter-
temporal budget constraints (14)and (15)be satisfied. Use
of (18) and (19) along with these equations allows us to
obtain
v = InCl + DlnC2
V* = InCr + D*lnCf
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 23be determined from (23). An increase in first-period gov-
ernment spending financed out of either taxes or domes-
tically-issued bonds (dGl = dl', + dB, dFg = 0) leads to
a fall in R* and a rise in r*. 22 Intuitively, the increase in
fiscal spending leads to an excess demand in the first-
period goodsmarket. Toeliminate this excessdemand, the
relative price offirst-period goodsinterms offuture goods,
that is, the interest rate, must rise. Given u, the level of r
rises as well.23
Observe from (20) and (21)that the resulting increase in
r* and corresponding decline in R* imply substitution
away from current consumption and towards future con-
sumption in both countries. Thus an increase in first-
period home government spending crowds out not only
current domestic consumption, but also current foreign
consumption. Part of the rise in domestic government
spending is "financed" through the crowding out of for-
eign consumption. In an interdependent world, increased
fiscal spending in one country is financed by higher
24
interest rates and the crowding out of private spending in
both countries. From (24), it may be discerned that even
though home consumption is crowded out, on balance, the
home country's trade balance worsens in response to the
fiscalstimulus.
Adeclinein controls on capital outflows in thedomestic
country diminishes the effect of fiscal policy on the home
country's interest rate r and magnifies the effect on the
foreign. interest rate r*. Intuitively, diminished capital
controls allow Italian residents greateraccess to the higher
ii!.terestratesavailable abroad. This lessens the bottling
up of domestic funds and allows domestic policies to
have.asmaller effect locally and a larger effect abroad.
This implies that current domestic consumption will be
crowded out less and foreign consumption more in re-
sponse to domestic fiscal stimulus as capital controls are
lowered. Note also that because the home country's current
levelofconsumptionfallsless, thefiscalexpansion leads to
a greater decline in the trade balance.
b. Shift from domestic to international public financing
Next, we considerthe effect of a switch in the financing
of given levels of current fiscal spending from domestic to
foreign sources (dGl = 0, dFg = - (dTl +dB) > 0); that
is, an increase (decrease) in public borrowing (lending)
abroad. Because thegovernmentfaces ahigher interest rate
abroad than dodomestic residents, such a shiftinfinancing
will have an effect on real behavior.
In particular, it may be shown that increased public
foreign borrowing leadsto a decline in r* andr. Thereason
isthat the increase in borrowing creates a negative domes-
tic; wealth effect since the private sector perceives that the
government will need to raise taxes to offset the greater
cost associated with borrowing at the relatively higher
foreigninterest rate. (Seeequation (14).)Thefallin wealth,
in tum, implies households will reduce their current con-
sumption, borrow less and/or lend more abroad, thereby
pushing down interest rates in both countries. Hence
increased government foreign borrowing crowds out pri-
vate foreign borrowing.
With declining interest rates, both countries will in-
crease first period consumption relative to second period
consumption. However, because domestic households ex-
perience a wealth loss directly proportional to theextent of
government foreign financing, the absolute level of con-
sumption falls in the home country, and its trade balance
improves correspondingly.
Increased integration diminishes the loss in wealth, the
channel through which government foreign financing ac-
tions affectprivate behavior.Correspondingly, thedeclines
Economic Review / Spring 1990in r* and r and the effects on bothdomestic and foreign
macro aggregates are reduced. In the absenceof capital
controls,Ricardian equivalence between foreign and do-
mesticfinancingholds, and thereis noeffectat all.>
c.. Internationally-financed government expenditures
Aninternationally-financed increase in government ex-
penditures, that is, dGI = dFg > 0, dTI + dB = 0,
represents thecombinationoftheprevious twocases. The
riseillgovefllment expenditures causesr*and r to rise.
Theincreasesin interestratesaredampened, however, by
theadversewealtheffectsofpublicforeign financing. The
neteffectsofthefiscal stimulus arequalitatively thesame
as.with domestically-financed government expenditures
whenthewealtheffectsassociatedwiththedecline (rise)in
foreign lending(borrowing) arenottoolarge.25 Thus, with
theexistence ofcapitalcontrols (u > 0) the domestic and
foreign interest rate are both less sensitive to interna-
tionally-financed temporary changes inhomecountry gov-
ernment spending. That is, an internationally-financed
increase in home country government spending leads to
smallerrises in r* and r thanfor a domestically-financed
increase. Thereasonis that, asnotedabove, when govern-
mentspendingis financed bymoreforeign publicborrow-
ing,hollle households perceive a fall in wealth. The
resultingdeclinein consumption lessens the pressureon
interestrates.
Thusthe larger the shareof homecountry government
spendingthat is financed internationally, the less is the
effect on foreign activity This dampening of the trans-
mission effectto foreign economies associated with the
Illethodoffinancing fiscal spending is dependent on the
presence ofcapital controls. As integration increases,
then, the transmission of changesin homecountry fiscal
policyincreases.26
Theanalysis indicates thatreducedrestrictions oncapi-
talflows increasethetransmissionofdisturbances, suchas
fiscal. policy shifts, across national borders. Domestic
disturbances have smallereffectsdomestically, and larger
effects on foreign economies. Conversely, foreign shocks
have largerimpacts on the domestic economy.
III.Conclusions
A major finding of our analysis is that, with greater
financial integration, agivendomestic fiscal expansion (or
adverse supplyshock) willplacelessupward pressure on
domestic interest rates and more upward pressure on
foreign interest rates. Correspondingly, current domestic
consumption will be crowded out by less and foreign
consumption by mote inresponse to domestic fiscal stim-
ulusascapitalcontrols arelowered. Thereasonhere isthat
thecloserlinkageoftheforeign andthedomestic financial
markets in effect "spreads" more of the effectof fiscal
stimulus internationally.
Ouranalysisthus.sheds lightonthetheoretical circum-
stances under which divergent fiscal policies may have




contributed.to realinstability associated withdivergences
in fiscal policy. 27 However, it is possible that further
liberalization measures combinedwitha different pattern
offiscal disturbances withintheECcouldgenerate greater
instability than has been observed so far. In particular,
eliminating controls on capital movements will further
increasethe degreeof linkageamongthe EC economies.
Fiscal actions inoneECnationwillbefeltbyitsneighbors
morethan before. A givenfiscal stimulus or contraction
wiII have larger international repercussions in this new
environment, andrecentproposals to limitthemagnitude
of budgetary divergences may be viewed as anattempt to
limitthesetransmission effects.
25NOTES
1. ~he so-called .Delors report, released in April 1989,
outlmes the specific steps required to achieve the "final
stage" of economic and monetary union in Europe. With
respect to macroeconomic policy coordination, the final
stage of economic and monetary union envisioned in-
volves permanently fixed exchange rates and possibly,
though not necessarily, a single EC currency. It also
:ecomn:~nds the setting of a Community-wide fiscal pol-
ICyP?sltlon an?close coordination of national budgetary
policies. Specifically, the report recommends "binding
rules" be adopted: (i) to impose effective upper limits on
bu~get. d~ficits of individual member countries, (ii) to
~tn~tly limitmonetary finance of budget deficits, and (iii)to
limit .external borrowing in non-EC member country cur-
rencies.
2.. Key (1989) provides an excellent summary of the in-
stitutional features of the international liberalization of
capital movements in Europe and the changes planned.
Our descriptive material in this section draws on his
article.
3. See Giavazzi and Giovannini (1986) for the role of
capital controls inthe workings of the European Monetary
System.
4. Frankeland MacAr~hur (1988)find a bias against capi-
tal outflows In Italy until 1983,a neutral effect in 1984 and
8: bias ~ffectively working to limit capital inflows in '1985
(I.e.! !tallancovered interest differentials weresignificantly
positive). The latt:r may be attributable to the temporary
constrainton capital Inflowsduring thistime: banks in Italy
were not allowed to increase their net debtor foreign
position from the second half of 1984to December 1985.
Bar<:me, et. al. (1989) provide a useful description of the
capital controls in effect in Italy during the 1980s.
? Although a new foreign exchange law in Italy enacted
In Oct~ber 1988 liberalized the controls on capital flows,
restrictions stili remain. (See Barone, et. al., 1989.) For
example, Italian residents still are not allowed to hold
funds in bank accounts abroad, and non-bank residents
are not permitted toextend credit linesto non-residents or
purchase money market instruments abroad with a matu-
rity of less six months. These residual controls should be
eliminated by the middle of 1990with the implementation
of the EC Directive on the liberalization of short-term
capital flows.
6. For Spain, Ireland, Portugal, and Greece the deadline
for removal of restrictions on capital movements is 1992
with a possible extension for Portugal and Greece. '
7. Several "safeguard" measures have been adopted in
tandem with the process of liberalization of capital move-
ments. These include a loan facility for member countries
with balance-of-payments difficulties and a clause allow-
ing the reimposition of capital controls in the event of
exchange crises. These measures have been put into
pla~e not so much because of a concern that surges in
capital outflo~s. would fC?llC?w as a consequence of lifting
the few remaining restnctions, but primarily because it
26
isbe!ieved tha~ exogenC?~s shocks-one of which may
be divergent fiscal positions-will lead to balance-of-
payments and exchange crises in a fully deregulated
environment.
8. AccordinQ to natic:nal sources, in 1987 the Italian pri-
vate a~~ Italian public sectors (excluding the monetary
aut.hontles) had net foreign liability positions of $37.6
billion and $35.9 billion, respectively.
9. Another motivation is the desire to maintain domes-
tic monetary control simultaneously with fixed exchange
rates. Large Qovernmentdebt issues may place pressure
for monetlz.atlon on the ?entral bank, which inturn may be
forced to. Impose capital controls to maintain the ex-
change rate objective.
10.:A number of papers have examined international
aspects of fiscal policies in models in which agents' inter-
temporal objectives and constraints are explicitly mod-
elled. See Frenkel and Razin (1985, 1987), Djajic (1985),
and Greenwood and Kimbrough (1985), among others.
11. In the case of controls on capital inflows, the analo-
gous condition to (5) would be (1 +r;)(1 +Ub) = 1 + rt,
where Ub reflects the added cost to Italian residents from
borrowing abroad.
12. Also, the intertemporal budget constraint implies TB1
+ RTB2 = 0, that is,the discounted sum of trade balance
surpluses must equal the sum of the inherited initial debt
which is zero in this model. Thus a trade deficit in the first
period must be followed by a surplus in the second.
13. Note that the definition of home country household
wealth i.n (14) discounts future output and government
expenditures at the domestic interest rate. Use of the
relation R = R*(1 +u) allows equation (14) to be rewrit-
ten as C1 + RC2 = Y1 + R*Y 2 - (G1 + R*G2) +
u[R*(Y2 - G2) - F9j ... W. This representation of the con-
solidated home country budget constraint separates
household wealth into a component that discounts future
output and government expenditures at the foreign inter-
estrate-whatmay be interpreted asthe "true" or shadow
interest rate ~or hom~ households-and a component
associated with the direct effects of capital controls on
household wealth.
14. Greenwood and Kimbrough (1985) obtain a similar
nonequivalence result, although in their model capital
controls take theform ofquantitative restrictions oncapital
flows.
15. One possible extension ofthe model isto assume that
capital controls take the form of an explicit tax on capital
outflows and that the government can extract at least a
fraction of the interest differential r* - r associated with
household foreign lending, F». It can be shown that if the
home government fully extracts this differential without
~ny de~dweight losses and if rational households fully
Internalize the effect of the controls on their wealth, Fg will
not matter.
16. A number of papers have modelled the circum-
stances under which the nonequivalence between taxa-
Economic Review / Spring 1990tion and domestic bonds breaks down in an international
setting. For example, Frenkel and Razin (1987, Chapter
11) develop a two-country version of Blanchard's (1985)
uncertain-lifetime setup in which the relevant household
discount rate is below that of the infinitely-lived govern-
ment.Obstfeld (1989)analyzes the long-term dynamics of
fiscal policy in a model with economic growth. In his
paper, nonequivalence between domestic debtand taxa-
tion arises because new households are assumed to be
unconnected with existing households. Since current
debtholders do not value the consumption of unborn
taxpayers, a fraction of public debt is perceived as net
wealthby existing households.
17. Greenwood and Kimbrough (1985) make a similar
point.
18. We db not directly analyze government optimization
decisions; hencewe ignore the problem ofthe time incon-
sistency of government policies.
19. The results would not be affected by including gov-
ernment spending levels in these utility functions as long
as preferences for the privately- and publicly-provided
goods were separable.
20. This relation is consistent with the summing of equa-
tions (1) and (8),which implies Y 1 C1 - G1 = - (FP +F9)
= TB1, that is, national saving equals the capital account
deficit, which, in turn, equals the current account surplus.
21. With capital controls, (24) reduces to TB 1 = [(0-0*)
(Y-G) - u((Y G)0*-F9)]/[2+0+0* + u(1+0*)]. In
this case the condition for TB 1< 0 is(Y- G) [0- 0*(1+u)]
+UF9<0.
22. An increase in current foreign fiscal expenditures
such that dG; = dT; + dB* has the same effect on r*. An
increase in second period fiscal spending in either coun-
try has the opposite effect.
23. In our benchmark model, output levels in the two
periods are assumed fixed and given by endowments.
Extending the model to allow real investment provides a
richer "supply side" to the model by causing output
growth to become endogenous. This would focus atten-
tion on production opportunities of each economy, as
government policies influence private investment deci-
sions and hence the future capital stock and output po-
tential. This supply mechanism generally dampens the
Federal Reserve Bankof SanFrancisco
effects of such exogenous changes as stimulatory fiscal
policy on interest rates. In addition, it implies that the net
impact of fiscal stimulus on aggregate income and con-
sumption could be positive, as suggested by typical
Keynesian models.
24. Inthis analysis the level of government financing (FQ)
is treated as an exogenous variable. In addition, it has
been assumed that the domestic government is unable to
extract any of the interest differential between domestic
and foreign interest rates through taxes. Relaxing this
assumption could create an incentive for the government
to exploit the corresponding arbitrage opportunity by
borrowing less abroad, where interest rates are higher,
and more at home. Such an analysis would necessitate
extending the model by specifying a government objec-
tivefunction and determining optimal government be-
havior.
25. Asufficientcondition is0 > u.
26. Our basic model focuses on the intertemporal terms
of trade--the real interest rate-as a central component
in the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy. Introduc-
ing non-tradable goodsfocuses attention on the intratem-
poral terms oftrade, that isthe real exchange rate, defined
as the inverse of the relative price of non-tradable goods
to tradable goods. In this case the effects of government
spending depend on the commodity composition and
time pattern ofthe spending. See Chapter9 of Frenkel and
Razin (1987) for a detailed exposition of the effects of
fiscal policy in a two-country, two-period model with trad-
able and non-tradable goods.
27. Tanzi and Ter-Minassian (1987) discuss in detail the
extent to which monetary and fiscal policies in the EC
members of the European Monetary System (EMS) have
tended to converge. Tanzi and Ter-Minassian argue that
the discipline associated with nearly fixing exchange
rates (despite the fact that there have been eight EMS
realignments since its inception resulting in a 27 percent
cumulative appreciation of the DM against other EMScur-
rencies) has been partly responsible for a convergence in
monetary policies and hence inflation rates. The con-
vergence of monetary policies has not been matched by a
convergence of fiscal policies, however.
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